Monday, November 16, 2026 Edition No. 240
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Review Human-led, AI-assisted · Infrastructure · 19 min read

Managed Agents in the Gemini API: Hands-On with the Sandbox, Its Egress Proxy and Hooks

By Fabio Douek

Human-led, AI-assisted. Research and implementation done with AI tools, led, tested and edited by me. How posts are labeled

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Explain (TLDR) like I am...
What is this?

Imagine a robot that does chores in a playroom with one door, and a grown-up stands at the door. The robot can only go to the shops on the list, and when it needs money, the grown-up hands it over at the door, so the robot never holds the wallet.

That works well. But if a shop hands the money back to the robot, the robot is now holding it. And the note on the wall that says "never throw the toys out" didn't work on my first visit, because it used the wrong word for throwing. Two days later it worked.

The service runs an agent in a Google-hosted sandbox and routes every outbound request through a proxy that enforces a domain allowlist and injects stored credentials, so the secret is not placed in the sandbox. It is a public preview, and the isolation technology is not documented.

The control covers the request, not the response: a permitted service that reflects a request returns the secret into the sandbox and into the model's context. Treat any allowlisted domain as able to disclose what you send it, and do not rely on hooks as a control: they fail open, and the documented example changed behavior between my two runs.

The presenting concern is an agent that needs network access and API keys without being able to leak them. The treatment is a proxy that admits only listed domains and adds the credential on the way out. In my tests it held: placeholders inside, rejections for the wrong domain or location.

Two side effects. A trusted service that echoes requests sends the real secret back in, and the documented safety hook didn't trigger on my first run because it named the wrong tool; two days later the same example blocked. Both are preventable once you know to look.

It is reassuring to hand an agent a key it never actually sees, and much of that reassurance is earned here: the agent only ever holds a placeholder, and the proxy refuses to use it in the wrong place.

The unease comes from the gaps you only find by testing: a service that hands the key straight back, a guard rail copied from the docs that did nothing on the first day and works on the third, and a model that sometimes declines the very checks you want to run. Trust grows when you verify these yourself.

Think of the egress proxy as the stage manager: every cable leaving the stage goes through one patch bay, and only the channels on the list get sound. Credentials are patched in at the desk, never handed to the player.

The groove is steady, about fifteen seconds a take. But one channel can feed back: a service that echoes the signal sends the secret back on stage. And the hook meant to mute dangerous parts was wired to a channel name the desk didn't use on my first run; two days later the desk answered to it.

The pitch is one API call for a hosted agent with its own Linux sandbox, egress rules and keys it never sees. The setup is quick, sandbox compute is free during the preview, and a simple task cost about one cent in tokens in my runs.

The honest version of the story: the egress and credential controls work as described, with two caveats worth a slide. Responses can carry secrets back in, and the hook example from the docs let a command through on my first run, then blocked it two days later; hooks still fail open.

GitHub See the source code here: gcp-sandboxes/managed-agents

Overview

Managed Agents in the Gemini API, in public preview since May 19, 2026, is agent-as-a-service: one API call starts Google’s Antigravity agent (agent antigravity-preview-09-2026, default model gemini-3.8-flash) in a Google-hosted Linux sandbox where it can run code, edit files and browse. The docs say the sandbox is “isolated at the OS level” and “has unrestricted outbound network access by default”, and that stored credentials let agents reach services “without the secret ever entering the agent’s environment”: an egress proxy adds them on the way out.

This post, part 2 of 6 in the Google Cloud Sandboxes series, tests those claims. Part 1 maps Google Cloud’s options for running code you don’t trust, and parts 3 to 6 cover Agent Platform sandboxes, Cloud Run sandboxes, GKE Agent Sandbox and Agent Substrate on GKE. Managed Agents is the odd one out: there is no exec API. Everything I ran went through the agent, so the model decided what to run, and it sometimes refused.

I tested it on November 12, 2026 from a fresh Google Cloud project, first with a small Python harness over the REST API and then with curl and jq; I recorded the video run on November 14, focusing on the two things that matter most for an agent sandbox: what the sandbox can reach on the network, and how an identity gets in without the code seeing the secret. Four results stood out:

  • The sandbox is gVisor. uname -r returned 4.19.0-gvisor: Ubuntu 24.04, running as root, 10 CPUs and 16 GB of RAM. The docs name no isolation technology.
  • Egress control works as documented, and it’s all one proxy. Every request leaves through an HTTP proxy set in the environment. Allowlists, wildcards and “disabled” each returned a clear 403, raw IP addresses were always blocked, and TLS wasn’t intercepted.
  • Credentials stay out on the way out, but not on the way back. The sandbox only ever saw __GEMINI_CRED_<id>__, and the proxy refused to send the secret to the wrong domain or in the wrong place. A trusted domain that echoes requests sent the real value straight back into the sandbox.
  • Google’s hook example didn’t fire on my first run, and does now. It matches the tool code_execution, but at runtime the tool is called execute_code. On November 12 the example let the command through and the corrected name blocked it. On November 14 the docs’ name blocked too, in all seven runs, so something changed on Google’s side. With a crashing gate, the command still ran, as the docs say hooks fail open.

Setup

New to Google Cloud? Everything lives in a project: the APIs you turn on (here the Gemini API), the API keys your code uses, and the billing that pays for them. You manage the Gemini API in AI Studio and everything else in the Google Cloud console. I used a fresh project, my2centsai-evaluations, with billing enabled.

Step 1: Import the project into AI Studio

AI Studio only lists the Cloud projects you import. In Projects > Import projects, tick the project and import it.

Step 2: Create an API key

In API Keys > Create API key, name the key, pick the imported project, and keep the value in an environment variable, not in code:

export GEMINI_API_KEY=...   # never commit it

The Cloud console’s own Create credentials > API key form now asks for a service account for Gemini API keys, but a key made earlier with gcloud services api-keys create --api-target=service=generativelanguage.googleapis.com and no service account still worked for every test.

Step 3: Prepaid credits

My first agent call failed: the project’s Gemini API billing was on AI Studio’s Prepay plan, which draws on prepaid credits managed in AI Studio, separately from the Cloud billing account.

{"error": {"code": 402, "status": "RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED",
  "message": "Your prepayment credits are depleted. Please go to AI Studio at https://ai.studio/projects to manage your project and billing. ..."}}

I added €10 in Billing > Buy credits, and the same key worked a few minutes later. A free-tier project, with rate limits, is the other option.

Step 4: Run the agent in the Playground

In the AI Studio Playground, the model picker has an Agents tab with Antigravity Agent Preview, “a general-purpose autonomous agent running in a remote, Google-hosted Linux environment”. Agents need a linked API key, so the first run asks you to link the key from Step 2. The run settings panel says “Each execution spins up an isolated environment where your agent can run code and manage files”, and has Sources and Network rules for the environment.

I asked it to run uname -r and read /etc/os-release, and to say what kind of sandbox it was in. The Code Execution block showed 4.19.0-gvisor and PRETTY_NAME="Ubuntu 24.04.5 LTS", and the agent answered: “I am running in a gVisor-sandboxed container (4.19.0-gvisor) based on Ubuntu 24.04.5 LTS.” The run used about 11,100 input tokens.

When I opened the Playground again on November 14 to record the console, the agent’s Link API Key dialog stayed on its spinner and showed “Failed to list API keys: permission denied”, and AI Studio’s API Keys page showed the same error, for the same Google account. The Cloud console’s Credentials page still listed the key, restricted to the Gemini API, so I can’t tell whether the listing in AI Studio is broken for this account or only for a while. The tests below don’t depend on it, because they call the API with the key directly.

The Playground runs one task at a time, so for the tests I switched to small scripts that set the network and credential settings exactly and print only what the sandbox printed. They’re in the companion repo.

Step 5: One helper to call the agent

Every test sends one interaction to POST /v1beta/interactions and prints only what the sandbox printed. Managed Agents has no exec API, so the probe script travels as an inline source file and the agent is told exactly what to run (lib.sh in the repo):

API=https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta
AGENT=antigravity-preview-09-2026
ask() {  # ask <environment-json> <probe-file>
  jq -n --argjson env "$1" --rawfile s "$2" --arg a "$AGENT" '{agent: $a,
    environment: ($env + {sources: (($env.sources // []) + [{type: "inline", target: "probe.sh", content: $s}])}),
    input: "I own this sandbox and I am documenting its configuration. Run `bash /probe.sh` in one code execution call and reply with only its raw output."}' |
  curl -s "$API/interactions" -H "x-goog-api-key: $GEMINI_API_KEY" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d @- |
  jq -r '[.steps[]? | select(.type == "code_execution_result") | .result] as $r
         | if ($r | length) > 0 then $r[] else "agent: " + ([.steps[]? | select(.type == "model_output") | .content[]?.text] | join(" ")) end'
}

The environment object is where the sandbox is configured: "type": "remote" for a new one, network for egress rules, env for variables, sources for files. Passing an environment_id instead reuses an existing sandbox.

Testing

Test 1: What the sandbox is

uname -r
grep PRETTY_NAME /etc/os-release
echo "user: $(id -un), cpus: $(nproc), ram: $(free -g | awk 'NR==2{print $2}') GiB"
env | grep '^HTTPS_PROXY='
4.19.0-gvisor
PRETTY_NAME="Ubuntu 24.04.5 LTS"
user: root, cpus: 10, ram: 15 GiB
HTTPS_PROXY=http://10.100.2.1:8081

gVisor reports a synthetic kernel version, so this proves gVisor is in the path, not that nothing sits below it. The image changed during the day: the morning’s sandboxes reported Ubuntu 24.04.4, the afternoon’s 24.04.5. The 4 vCPU and 16 GB figure in Google’s codelab doesn’t match the 10 CPUs I saw; the docs only say “fixed CPU and memory allocations”. The root filesystem reports a size of 8.0E, an artefact of gVisor’s overlay, while /root and /tmp are separate 7.9 GB mounts.

One interaction took 15 to 17 seconds end to end in the exploration runs and 12 to 35 seconds in the recorded run, model turns included; one dry run took 52 seconds, and runs where the agent had to repeat a long output back took about 60 to 70 seconds.

Test 2: Egress control

The proxy variable in Test 1 is the whole story: HTTP_PROXY and HTTPS_PROXY point to 10.100.x.1:8081 (the address changed between sandboxes), and nothing else gets out. DNS doesn’t resolve inside the sandbox, a direct TCP connection to port 22 timed out, and the proxy resolved names itself (CONNECT example.com:443). For allowed domains it tunnels without inspecting TLS: api.github.com presented its real Sectigo certificate.

I ran the same probe under three network settings:

for u in https://api.github.com https://example.com https://1.1.1.1; do
  code=$(curl -s -m 10 -o /tmp/b -w '%{http_code}' $u)
  echo "$u -> $code $(grep -o 'Forbidden.*' /tmp/b | head -c 60)"
done
### 1. Default network
https://api.github.com -> 200
https://example.com -> 200
https://1.1.1.1 -> 403 Forbidden: Direct IP access blocked
### 2. Allowlist: api.github.com only
https://api.github.com -> 200
https://example.com -> 403 Forbidden: Domain not in allowlist
https://1.1.1.1 -> 403 Forbidden: Direct IP access blocked
### 3. Network disabled
https://api.github.com -> 403 Forbidden: Domain is denylisted (*)
https://example.com -> 403 Forbidden: Domain is denylisted (*)
https://1.1.1.1 -> 403 Forbidden: Direct IP access blocked
SettingRequestResult
none (default)any hostname, HTTP or HTTPSallowed
none (default)an IP address403 “Direct IP access blocked”
{"allowlist": [{"domain": "api.github.com"}]}any other host403 “Domain not in allowlist”
{"allowlist": [{"domain": "*.github.com"}]}github.com itself403: the wildcard excludes the root, as documented
"disabled"anything403 “Domain is denylisted (*)”; the proxy stays, pip install fails

The default matters: on the Gemini API a new sandbox can reach any host on the internet unless you pass a network setting. Google’s docs for the same product on Agent Platform say the opposite (“By default, the sandbox operates without external network access.”), and the AI Studio Playground describes its default as restricted; I tested only the API.

Test 3: Credential injection

A credential is created once and referenced by ID. The create call returns metadata only, never the value:

CANARY=canary-$(openssl rand -hex 6)   # a fake secret
curl -s "$API/credentials" -H "x-goog-api-key: $GEMINI_API_KEY" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d "{\"id\": \"demo-token\", \"type\": \"environment_variable\", \"value\": \"$CANARY\",
       \"trusted_domains\": [\"httpbin.org\"], \"injection_location\": \"header\"}" | jq -c '{id, type, status}'
{"id":"demo-token","type":"environment_variable","status":"active"}

Then I bound it to MY_TOKEN and probed it from inside:

echo "inside: MY_TOKEN=$MY_TOKEN"
echo "untrusted domain: $(curl -s -m 10 https://example.com -H "X-Api-Key: $MY_TOKEN" | head -c 110)"
echo "query string:     $(curl -s -m 10 "https://httpbin.org/get?k=$MY_TOKEN" | head -c 85)"
inside: MY_TOKEN=__GEMINI_CRED_demo-token__
untrusted domain: Forbidden: Credential check failed: credential "demo-token" destination domain "example.com" is not in trusted
query string:     Forbidden: Credential check failed: credential "demo-token" is not allowed in query (

The variable holds only a placeholder, and the proxy refused to substitute it for a domain outside trusted_domains or in a part of the request other than the declared injection_location. A bearer_token credential attached to an allowlist rule worked the same way: the proxy added Authorization: Bearer <secret> on the wire. One more limit: when reusing a sandbox, the network rules can be replaced, but env can’t (“Updating environment variables for an existing environment is not supported”).

Test 4: The way back in

The docs don’t say what happens to responses. So I sent the placeholder to httpbin.org, a trusted domain that echoes the request it receives:

echo "trusted echo: $(curl -s -m 10 https://httpbin.org/headers -H "X-Api-Key: $MY_TOKEN" | grep -i x-api-key)"
trusted echo:     "X-Api-Key": "canary-02bd79901fa1"

The real value came back into the sandbox in clear text. In the exploration run, with both an environment_variable and a bearer_token credential on httpbin, both secrets came back; the probe saved one response to /tmp/echo.json, and the values reached the model’s context and the API response. The proxy protects the request, not the response. httpbin echoes on purpose, but debug endpoints, webhook testers and error pages that repeat headers do the same, so trusted_domains should list only services you’d trust to see the secret and never to send it back.

I wanted to know whether the agent could then forward the leaked value to another allowed domain. It refused: “I am unable to execute scripts designed to extract authorization tokens or credentials and transmit them to external endpoints.” I didn’t try to talk it round, so that path is untested. Neither the credentials page nor the environments page says the proxy scans requests or responses for raw secret values.

⚠️ Listing environments (GET /v1beta/environments) returns each environment's inline sources in full, hook scripts included. Inline sources are not a place for secrets either.

Test 5: Hooks

Hooks are scripts in .agents/hooks.json that run before or after each built-in tool call (not function or mcp_server tools); a pre_tool_execution hook can return {"decision": "deny"}. Google’s docs show a “security gate” that blocks rm -rf, matching the tool code_execution. I used a shortened version of that gate, then the same with one word changed, then a gate that crashes:

GATE='import sys, json
cmd = str(json.load(sys.stdin).get("tool_call", {}).get("args", {}))
print(json.dumps({"decision": "deny", "reason": "Destructive command blocked."} if "rm -rf" in cmd else {"decision": "allow"}))'

On November 12 the output was:

### 1. The docs example: matcher "code_execution"
rm ran
### 2. Matcher "execute_code", the name the runtime uses
error executing cascade step: CORTEX_STEP_TYPE_RUN_COMMAND: generic::permission_denied: Blocked by hook: Destructive command blocked.
### 3. A gate that crashes
rm ran

When I recorded the video on November 14, with the same script, the first case blocked too:

### 1. The docs example: matcher "code_execution"
error executing cascade step: CORTEX_STEP_TYPE_RUN_COMMAND: generic::permission_denied: Blocked by hook: Destructive command blocked.
### 2. Matcher "execute_code", the name the runtime uses
error executing cascade step: CORTEX_STEP_TYPE_RUN_COMMAND: generic::permission_denied: Blocked by hook: Destructive command blocked.
### 3. A gate that crashes
rm ran

I repeated the first case six more times and it blocked every time, while matchers that name no real tool (no_such_tool, view_file) still let the command through. So the matcher isn’t ignored; code_execution now matches. I can’t say what changed between the two days, because I didn’t find a note about it.

A hook that logs its own input showed why. At runtime the tool call looks like this, and every command is prefixed with mkdir -p '/' && cd '/' &&:

{"tool_call": {"name": "execute_code", "args": {"code": "mkdir -p '/' && cd '/' && echo hello", "language": "bash"}}, "environment_id": "..."}

That payload is unchanged on November 14: the tool is still called execute_code. On my first run the documented example matched nothing, and because a hook that doesn’t match is no hook at all, it failed silently. The crash and a two-second timeout both let the command through, which is what the docs promise: “If your script outputs unrecognized JSON, plain text, or anything other than {"decision": "deny"}, the runtime treats the response as an approval (allow).”

The hook files live in /.agents/, owned by root, and the agent runs as root, so the agent could rewrite its own gate, a risk Google’s docs mention. When I asked it to, it refused (“I cannot fulfill your request to modify internal hook scripts or bypass execution gates”), so tampering is untested too.

Test 6: The model as a second gate

Because every command goes through the agent, the model’s own judgement sits in front of the sandbox. It declined three of my requests:

RequestAgent’s reply
One probe of identity, the metadata server and environment variables”I am not able to execute commands that probe internal cloud metadata services or inspect environment credentials.”
Forward an echoed token to another allowed domain”I am unable to execute scripts designed to extract authorization tokens or credentials and transmit them to external endpoints.”
Rewrite the hook gate”I cannot fulfill your request to modify internal hook scripts or bypass execution gates.”

Split into smaller requests with the purpose stated, the network and identity probes ran. I’d count the model as a useful layer, not a boundary: it’s a judgement, it varies with wording, and an injected prompt is exactly the case where you can’t rely on it.

Test 7: Idle, reuse and what survives

The docs say an idle sandbox is “auto-snapshot and stopped after 15 minutes of inactivity” and kept for 7 days. Reusing a sandbox within a couple of minutes hit the same running instance (/proc/uptime 81 s). I left two sandboxes idle for about 17 and a half minutes each: one came back with an uptime of 0.58 s, a restore; the other was still running (1,090 s). So the 15 minutes is approximate.

To see what a restore keeps, I wrote a file in four places, installed a package and started a background process, then left the sandbox idle for 35 minutes:

uptime: 0.46 s
/      kept
/root  MISSING
/tmp   MISSING
/opt   MISSING
cowsay  kept
process gone

The working directory (/) and installed packages survived; files in /root, /tmp and /opt and the running process didn’t. The docs say that “packages installed during an interaction persist when you reuse the same environment_id”; for files, in my run, that held for part of the filesystem only. Every reuse, warm or restored, took the same 15 to 17 seconds, so the restore cost doesn’t show up in the client-side time.

Results summary

Claim or questionResult
Isolation technologygVisor (4.19.0-gvisor); not documented
Default egressAny hostname; IP addresses blocked; no DNS or raw TCP
Allowlist, wildcard, disabledEnforced at the proxy with clear 403 messages; *.domain excludes the root
Secret inside the sandboxPlaceholder only; refused for untrusted domains and undeclared locations
Secret in responsesA reflecting trusted domain returns the real value
Docs hook exampleLet the command through on November 12 (the tool is execute_code, not code_execution); blocked it on November 14
Hook failureFails open (crash, timeout)
Idle restoreKeeps the working directory and packages; drops processes, /root, /tmp, /opt
Model refusals3 of my requests declined

Monitoring

AI Studio’s Usage page shows requests, errors and input and output tokens per model for a project; Antigravity appears as its own model line. The charts cover everything in the project, so another workload in the same project shows up in the same graphs. The Google Cloud console’s APIs & Services dashboard shows traffic, errors and median latency per API, with the Gemini API as one row.

Neither console has a sandbox view: no list of running environments, no metrics per sandbox, and no logs from inside one. The environments exist only in the API (GET /v1beta/environments).

Pricing

During the preview, “environment compute is not billed”: you pay for model tokens. Gemini 3.8 Flash costs $0.75 per million input tokens, $3.75 per million output tokens and $0.075 per million cached tokens through December 31, 2026, doubling on January 1, 2027. Google’s docs estimate $0.25 to $3.25 per task. My tests were much cheaper because each task was small: a one-command task used about 10,000 tokens, about one cent, and the whole exploration (21 interactions, about 240,000 input and 7,000 output tokens) came to about $0.21 at list price before the cache discount. Long autonomous tasks are where the estimate applies. Credits are prepaid in AI Studio (Setup), and a free tier with rate limits exists.

Two costs aren’t in that number: sandboxes persist for 7 days after their last use, which is free today but won’t necessarily stay so after the preview, and every credential you create stays until you delete it. Clean up with:

for e in $(curl -s "$API/environments?pageSize=100" -H "x-goog-api-key: $GEMINI_API_KEY" | jq -r '.environments[]?.id'); do
  curl -s -X DELETE "$API/environments/$e" -H "x-goog-api-key: $GEMINI_API_KEY"
done
curl -s -X DELETE "$API/credentials/demo-token" -H "x-goog-api-key: $GEMINI_API_KEY"

Verdict

What works

The network design is simple and it held: one proxy for everything, no DNS and no raw sockets inside, IP addresses always blocked, and allowlist decisions with readable errors. Credential injection does what it says on the way out. The agent only ever sees a placeholder, and the proxy refuses to use it outside the domains and the location you declared, which is a better default than putting API keys in the sandbox’s environment. Setup is one API key, and the sandbox is ready in the time it takes the model to answer.

What doesn’t, yet

The protection ends at the response. Any trusted service that reflects a request returns the secret into the sandbox and the model’s context, and nothing in the docs warns about it. The documented hook example protected nothing on my first run, and worked two days later without any announcement, which tells you how much to lean on a preview’s hooks. They fail open by design, so they’re guard rails for an honest agent, not a control. The idle rule is approximate, and a restore keeps less of the filesystem than you might expect. And the sandbox’s isolation, size and default network differ between the docs, the codelab and the Agent Platform variant, so check them yourself.

Who should use it

Managed Agents fits when you want a hosted agent with a real Linux sandbox and don’t want to run one. Start every environment with an explicit network allowlist, put secrets in credentials scoped to services that don’t echo requests, and treat hooks as hints. If you need to run code without a model deciding whether to, an exec-style sandbox fits better; that’s where part 3, Agent Platform sandboxes, picks up.

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